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Summary findings
After weighing the costs and benefits of pollution  evidence suggests that heavy polluters are affected more
control, profit-maximizing firms sometimes choose not  significantly than minor polluters. And firms whose
to invest in pollution abatement because the penalty they  market values are hurt most by the release of this
expect regulators to impose for noncompliance falls  information  are most likely to invest in pollution
short of the cost of abatement. To improve incentives for  abatement.
pollution control, regulators have recently embarked on  The firms' greater willingness to invest in pollution
a strategy to release information to communities and  abatement seems-to result from the regulators'
markets (investors and consumers) about firms'  willingness to undertake  strong enforcement actions
environmental performance.  combined with the possibility of capital markets reacting
Drawing on evidence from American and Canadian  to public ranking of firms in terms of their
studies, Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy report that capital  environmental performance.
markets do react to the release of such information. The
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D.C. 20433, United States.EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
It  has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of pollution  control,
profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their resources in pollution abatement
since  the  expected  penalty  imposed  by  regulators  falls  considerably  short  of  the
investment cost. Regulators have recently embarked on a deliberate strategy to release
information  to  communities  and  markets  (investors and  consumers)  regarding  firms'
environmental performance in order to enhance incentives for pollution control. In this
paper,  we  analyze the  role  that  capital markets  may play  to  create  such  incentives.
Evidence drawn from American and Canadian studies indicates that capital markets react
to the release of information, and that large polluters are affected more significantly from
such release than smaller polluters. Recent evidence also shows that firms whose market
values are most adversely affected by the release of information also tend to react more
strongly by investing in pollution abatement. This result appears to be a function of the
regulator's  willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions as well as the possibility
for  capital  markets  to  rank  and  compare  firms  with  respect  to  their  environmental
performance.
As part of its research effort, a group of researchers in the Policy Research Department
(PRDEI) are currently analysing the reaction of capital markets to environmental news in
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and the Philippines. Results of this research will soon be made
available.
2I.  Introduction
A large number of authors have pointed out the lack of appropriate monitoring
activities  and  weak  enforcement pertaining  to  the  implementation  of  environmental
regulations.' Resources devoted to monitoring activities allow regulators to perform only a
limited  number  of  those  activities. 2 Given  these  limited  resources,  regulators  have
indicated a desire to direct their monitoring resources towards those plants most likely to
be  out of  compliance. 3 Moreover, when compliance with the standards is  found to  be
lacking, it is generally acknowledged that fines or penalties (as imposed by regulators and
courts) are too low (compared to pollution abatement costs) to act as effective deterrents. 4
For example, O'Connor (1994) writes:
We define  monitoring as the set of activities  aimed  at verifying  the status  of compliance  of a specific
polluter  with  the applicable  standards;  among  others,  these  activities  include  inspections  of a
polluter's facilities  and sampling (see  Magat and  Viscusi  (1990) for a description  of the various  types
of inspections  undertaken  by the USEPA).  We defne enforcement as the set of actions  and penalties
that can be used by a regulator  to penalize  non-compliance  with  the regulation.  Monitoring  and
enforcement  together  determine  the expected  penalty  of non-compliance  with  the regulation.  A profit-
maximizing  firm would  compare  this expected  penalty  with the expected  cost of abating  pollution  to
determine  the course  of action  that maximizes  profits.
2  Russell  (1990) writes:  "What is missing  is a commitment  of resources  to check  up on whether  those
covered  by the law and regulations  are doing  (or not doing)  what is required  of (or forbidden  to)
them." (p. 243)
3  See Silverman  (1990) and Canada  (1992).  Strictly  speaking,  such  a strategy  would  ignore  however
that the nature  and amount  of damages  caused  by a unit of pollution  are in most cases a function  of
the characteristics  of the local  environment  in  which  this unit is released.  Dion,  Lanoie  and  Laplante
(1997)  have shown  that in fact  the potential  for environmental  damages  partly  explains  the regulator's
inspection  strategy  in  the pulp and  paper industry  in Quebec.  Furthermore,  along with  Deily and Gray
(1991, 1996),  they show  that  monitoring  and  enforcement  activities  are also  a function  of variables
such as local labor  market  conditions  (e.g.  local unemployment  rate),  and the visibility  of the plant in
the local  area.
4  See  Russell  (1990) and Saxe (1989).  Fundamental  to the penalty is the recovery  of any economic
benefit  which  accrued  as the result of the violation  of enviromnental  law.  The EPA  uses a computer
model  (called  BEN)  to estimate  a violator's  economic  benefit  from avoiding  compliance.  It is based
on an opportunity  cost  argument:  by delaying  compliance  with the standard,  the money  that should
have been  spent on pollution  control  can be invested  on other  revenue-generating  activities.  BEN
therefore  calculates  the difference  between  the present  value  of compliance  versus  non-compliance
(see Libber  (1991) for more  details).  It is not clear however  that  these  penalties  indeed  recover  the
3In several  of the countries  studied  here, 5 the monitoring  problem  is
compounded  by weak enforcement.  In short, when violators of
standards  are detected,  if penalised  at all they often  face  only weak
sanctions.  (...)  polluters  are exempted  from fines either  on grounds
of financial  hardship  or because  the violators  wield undue  political
influence.  Perhaps  the most pervasive  problem  is that, even  when
fines are levied,  they are frequently  so low in real terms that they
have  little if any  deterrent  value.  (p. 94)6
More recently, the USEPA found that some of the largest industrial  states may not be
enforcing  federal  laws  governing  air and  water  pollution:
Environmental  Protection  Agency officials say they have found
that  Pennsylvania  and some  other  big industrial  states  are reporting
only a  handful of major pollution violations, suggesting  that
inspectors  in those states may be turning  a blind eye to pollution
problems.  (New York  Times,  December  15, 1996)
If indeed the expected  penalty for non-compliance,  as imposed  by environrnental
regulators  and courts  were so low, one  would  have  difficulties  to explain  the generally  high
level of compliance  with regulation  in developed  countries,  and the very large variance  in
the environmental  performance  of plants  in developing  countries.  Hence  there  must be other
economic  benefits  gained  by violators  (General  Accounting  Office,  1991).  In Canada,  the recovery  of
economic  benefit  is not a common  practice  (see  Ontario,  1993).
Those  being Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  and Indonesia.
6  While  we do not wish  to argue that  the experience  of these East  Asian  countries  is directly
comparable  and similar  to the North  American  experience,  there are nonetheless  more  similarities
than may appear  at first  glance.  For example,  Deily and Gray  (1991)  have found  in the US steel
industry  that plants  with  a higher  probability  of closing  as a result of having  to comply  with  the
environmental  regulation  are subject  to a lesser  amount  of monitoring  and enforcement  activities.  In
other  words,  for the purpose  of monitoring  and enforcement,  regulators  target plants  that may  have a
greater  capacity  to invest  in  pollution  control  or pay  the fines and penalties  associated  with being out
of compliance.  In Canada,  courts  have  used a number  of mitigating  factors  to  justify the imposition
of small  penalties  on polluters  violating  environmental  regulations.  These  include:  the accused  is a
small company,  expressed  remorse  and desire  to avoid similar  offenses  in the future,  has a strong
sense of community  in which  it takes  some  pride, may  have  to shut down the factory  with a loss of
jobs and dire and severe  financial  consequences  to the accused  and to its employees,  etc. (Canada,
1988).
4incentives than those  provided by  regulators and courts that could explain a  polluter's
environmental performance. As such, the potential role and impact of local communities
and markets (including consumers and investors) are the object of  increasing scrutiny. 7
Once the role and potential impact of these agents are properly acknowledged, once the
conditions under which the action of these agents may be effective are identified, fines and
penalties imposed by regulators and courts may not appear to be in many circumstances the
most  appropriate or effective incentives for pollution control. In fact, the USEPA has
recently pointed out that "EPA's job should grow from primarily the "enforcer" to include
greater emphasis on helping citizens make informed choices in their daily lives" (EPA,
1991, p.2).
Hence, while there is a growing concern that fines and penalties imposed on agents
out of compliance are not severe enough to have a deterrence effect,8 some authors have
challenged the  conclusion that  polluters therefore have no  incentives to  comply  with
environmental standards. In particular, in view  of the increasing facility of  access and
exchange of information, communities and markets (both consumers and investors) bear an
increasing amount of attention as to  their capacity to  generate incentives for pollution
7  Afsah,  Laplante  and Wheeler  (1996)  have  recently  developed  a new  paradigm  for controlling  industrial
pollution  in developing  countries  which  explicitly  includes,  as sources  of incentives,  local  communities,
and markets.
8  Russell  (1990)  writes:  "Efforts  to monitor  regulated  behavior  appear  to have  been inadequate  to the
task - a very  difficult  task in  many instances  - and typical enforcement  practices  appear  to have been
insufficiently  rigorous."  (p. 243; italics  ours).  On the difficulty  of the task, see General  Accounting
Office  (1987, 1993,  1994).
5control. 9 A significant  amount  of research  and experiments  remain  to be performed  in order
to identify  the circumstances  under  which  the activities  of these  agents  may  be effective,  the
conditions  under which the incentives  they generate  may substitute  for or complement
"typical enforcement  practices",  and the proper role of the regulator  to empower  these
agents.  In this paper, our purpose  is to discuss  and examine  how investors have reacted  to
the release of public information  regarding the environmental  performance  of specific
plants,  as observed  and measured  by fluctuations  on the stock  market.' 0 While  some of this
information is revealed through regular coverage by  newspapers, it  also includes a
deliberate use and release of  information  by regulators regarding the environmental
performance  of individual  plants.
In the next section,  we discuss  the nature  of the role of capital  markets  with respect
to providing incentives for pollution control." In section III, we briefly describe the
methodology typically used to  measure the  reaction of  investors to  the release of
environmental  information.  In section  IV, we review  the results of the studies that have
9  While  the current  paper focuses  exclusively  on the role of information  to generate  incentives  for
pollution control, the ever  greater  easiness  of access  to information  suggests  numerous  other
applications.  For example,  the medical  license  board  of Massachusetts  now  gives public  access  to
disciplinary  records  and malpractice  histories  of physicians  in  the state; it has also  been suggested  that
airlines  give public  access  to their safety  records:  number  of crashes,  safety  violations,  etc. (The
Economist, January  11, 1997);  the Government  of Philippines  is currently  putting  in place a rating
system  to compare  and publicly  reveal  the performance  of concessionaires  providing  water supply  to
the various  quarters  of Manila.
10  A related  but different  question  of interest  is whether  or not firms  with  good environmental
performance  have a higher  market  valuation  than plants  with  bad environmental  performance,  other
things  being equal.  On analysis  of this  nature, see Cormier  et al. (1993)  and the references  therein.
1  For the role of communities  and  impact  of communities'  actions,  see Dasgupta  and Wheeler  (1997),
Dion,  Lanoie  and Laplante  (1997),  and  Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996).
6examined the reaction of investors to the announcement of environmental incidents (such as
lawsuits, fines, accidents, etc.), or list of polluters (e.g. Toxics Release Inventory). We also
present the results of a new study that examines the reaction of investors to the publication
of  lists  of  firms  in  British  Columbia  that  either  fail  to  comply  with  environmental
regulations or that are of concern to the Ministry of the Environment of British Columbia.
We conclude in section V.
II.  The  role  of capital  markets
Unanticipated events, or new information may lead capital markets to revise their
expectations regarding the profitability of an enterprise. Changes in markets values thus
provide estimates of changes in the net present value of expected profits as a result of the
event, or new information,  relative to the situation where the event would not have occurred
or the information would not have been available.
It  has been argued earlier that  penalties imposed by  regulators and  courts  are
generally set too low to act as effective deterrents and prevent violation of environmental
regulations. For example in the United States, the EPA pursues civil enforcement actions
(as opposed to administrative penalties or criminal enforcement actions) to respond to the
more serious or recalcitrant violators. In FY1990, civil penalties totalled $ 61  329 237
imposed in 1 400 cases, for an average penalty of $ 43 806. In FY1991, civil penalties were
$ 72 835 251 in 1 419 cases; the average penalty increased to $ 51 330. The average penalty
imposed under the Clean Water Act has steadily increased since 1986 to reach $ 405 436 in
71991.  The maximum  civil  penalty  imposed  in FY1990  was $ 15 000  000 and $ 6 184  220 in
FY 1991. In Canada,  data on the number  of prosecutions,  convictions,  and penalties are
sparse  and not necessarily  comparable  across  provinces.' 2 Nonetheless,  it is interesting  to
note  that penalties  in Canada  are typically  much  lower  than in the United  States.  In Alberta,
14 prosecutions  were initiated  by the Attorney  General's  Office in 1990;  total fines levied
were $ 37 275 against  8 companies.  In Ontario,  total fines levied  increased  from $ 605 668
in 1985-86  to $ 3 633 095 in 1992. Given  the number  of convictions,  average  penalties
increased  from $ 9 330 to $ 14 250. Despite  the increase  (as noted by Saxe, 1989),  fines
remain low. In British  Columbia,  79 convictions  were obtained  over the period April 1 -
September  30, 1992;  average  fines were then slightly  less than $ 3 000.13  More recently,
over the period October 1 1995  to March  30 1996,  total fines of $ 219 200 were levied  in
British  Columbia  on 116  convictions  for an average  of less  than  $ 2 000 (the maximum  fine
was $ 20 000 and there were 59 fines of $ 500 or smaller).  Criminal actions,  in which  the
regulator  typically  seeks imprisonment  of the defendant(s),  remain  rare events.
Given the small size of those penalties,  markets are more likely to revise their
estimates  of the present  value of a firm  only  to the extent  that the information  leads  them to
revise their expectations  regarding  future  production  costs (including  the pollution  control
costs) or the ability of the firm to generate  revenues  at the levels originally  expected.  As
shown in  Figure 1, information  about the pollution efficiency of  the  firm and its
12  Upon  completing  an extensive  study  of the  environmental  regulation  in the  Canadian  pulp  and  paper
industry,  Sinclair  (1991)  writes  "the  data  available  on  prosecutions  are  limited"  (p. 102).
13  Environment  Policy  and  Law,  March  1993.
8environmental  performance  may act as a signal for its expected  long-term  profitability:  a
superior  environmental  performance  may indicate  a greater  ability  to increase  revenues  and
generate  cost savings.
Figure  1
From environmental  management to financial performance
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It is expected that the enviromnental information plays an important signalling role.
It is interesting to note that this information may concern solely a given enterprise or may
9directly  or indirectly  allow  a comparison  of the environmental  performance  of an enterprise
to the performance  of other firms (such as lists of firms ranked  in one way or another by
their environmental  performance).  Information  of both nature,  which  we may call individual
information  and collective information  respectively,  may affect expectations  regarding
production  costs and revenues.  However,  we would argue that individual  information  is
more likely to have a relatively larger impact on expectations  of production costs (as
opposed  to revenues),  while  collective  information  is more likely  to have a larger  impact  on
expectations  of revenues  (as opposed  to production  costs).
Indeed,  in most cases  individual  information  takes  the form of an announcement  of
an event that is generally  not favourable  to the enterprise  such as a violation  of regulation,
the announcement  of an incident  causing  damages  to the environment  (such  as a spill),  the
announcement  of a lawsuit  against  the enterprise,  etc. As mentioned  earlier,  given the size
of  the  penalties imposed by  courts and  regulators, it  is  unlikely upon  such  an
announcement,  that changes in market values, if any, would solely reflect expectations
regarding the  size of  a  potential penalty. These changes are more likely to  reflect
expectations  that the firm may  be the target of closer scrutiny  and further  enforcement
actions,  that citizens  and community  groups  may pressure  the firm to reduce  its emissions
(even below environmental  standards),  and as a result that it may have to invest large
resources  (financial  and others,  e.g. time) in pollution  control.  We would  therefore  expect
changes in market value, if any, to be larger (potentially  much larger) than traditional
10penalties imposed  by courts and regulators.' 4 A further question  of interest therefore is
whether or not these large observed  changes  in market  value, caused  by the provision of
new  information,  provide  enough  incentives  for investments  in pollution  control.
While  individual  information  may also lead  consumer  groups  to boycott  the good(s)
produced  by the enterprise,  thus  leading  to a revision  of the expectations  on future  revenues,
the degree of substitution  that is taking place may be limited due to the absence of
information  regarding  the environmental  performance  of other  enterprises.  On the contrary,
collective information  which compares  firms with bad performance  to those with good
performance  is more likely to allow this substitution  to take place since it gives an
alternative  to those consumers  and investors  who want to substitute  away from the firms
with a bad environmental  performnance.  Moreover, since pollution efficiency is often
associated  to overall  production  efficiency,' 5 collective  information  indirectly  (and  perhaps
imperfectly)  allows  a comparison  of the overall efficiency  of the enterprise.  This explains
why we expect collective  information  to have a greater  impact on expectations  of future
revenues  than individual  information.
Whether or not markets react to the release of new information  regarding the
environmental  performance  of firms  (whether  individual  or collective  infornation)  remains
ultimately  an empirical  issue. In the next  section,  we briefly  discuss  the methodology  used
14  Though  in a different  context,  Jarrell  and Peltzman  (1985) found  that capital  markets  penalizes
producers  of recalled  drugs and cars  far more  than  the direct  costs.
5  See Porter  and van der Linde  (1995).
11to measure market  reactions.  In section  IV, we present  a number  of empirical  studies and
discuss  the results  of those  studies  in view of the hypotheses  developed  above.
111.  Event-study  methodology
The methodology  used  in this field  of research  is akin  to event-study  analyses  which
is based on the assumption  that the capital  market is sufficiently  efficient  to evaluate  the
impact  of new information  (events)  on expected  future  profits  of the finns.6 The reaction  to
the announcement  of an event is obtained  by predicting  a "normal"  return for each firm
during an "event window"  (usually  the day prior to the event, the day of the event, and a
number  of days after  the event),  and then subtracting  this predicted  normal  return from the
actual return observed  on those days following  the announcement  of the event. Normal
returns are generated by  estimating a  version of the  Capital Assets Pricing Model
(CAPM): 17
(1)  Rit  = (I1-  Pi )Rft  + PjRt  + eit
where  Rit is the rate of return  on security  i for day t; RR  is the rate of return on a risk-free
asset; Rt  is the rate of return of a market index (such as the Dow Jones market index); J,  is
the estimated  parameter;  and  eit  is the error  term for security  i on day t. The CAPM  model  is
16  The methodology  was originally  developed  by Fama et al. (1969)  and Fama (1976).  This
methodology  has been  used to analyze  the reaction  of investors  to numerous  events  of a different
nature:  product  liability  suits  (Viscusi  and  Hersch,  1990),  airline  crashes  (Borenstein  and Zimmerman,
1988;  Chance  and Ferris,1987),  workplace  safety violations  (Fry and Lee, 1989),  etc. Henderson
(1990) notes  that in 1987  and 1988,  14  event  studies  were published  in the Journal  of Finance,  and
26 in the Journal of  Financial  Economics.
17  A number  of alternative  models  can be used to test the robustness  of the results  (for example,  the
single-index  market  model  or the market  adjusted  returs  model).  Typically,  these  alternative  tests
yield results  of a similar  nature  as those obtained  by using  CAPM.  See Henderson  (1990) for further
details  and discussion.
12estimated  for each firm over a number  of days before the event window  (usually  between
120  and 210 days).
In absence  of unexpected  information,  the relationship  between  the firm's  return,  the
market's return and the return of the risk-free asset should be unchanged.  Hence,  these
returns  can be used  to forecast  the normal  return  for the firm.  A prediction  error is generated
when unexpected  information  affects  the return  for the firm without  affecting  the market's
return and  the risk-free  asset's rate  of return. The prediction  error,  commonly  referred  to as
the abnormal  return  (AR)  for security  i at time  t (AR 1J,  is computed  as the following:
(2)  ARi, = R, -Rft-p  *j(Rmt-Rfl)
The day the event is announced  is referred  to as day 0, and all other days are measured
relative  to day  0. The average  abnormal  return  is then  computed  across  firms:
(3)  AARt = (1/ Nt),AR 1 t
i=1
where  Nt is the number  of securities  in a given subsample.  A statistical  test (t-test)  is then
used to determine  the level of significance  of abnormal  returns  for a given  subsample.  The
test uses the estimated  standard  error  of the returns  computed  for the estimation  period:
(4)  t = AAR, / 9(AAR,)
where 9(AARt) is the estimated  standard  error of abnormal  returns during  the estimation
period.
13IV.  Empirical  analyses
Following these lines of argument, a number of papers have investigated, using the
event-study methodology, how capital markets can provide incentives for pollution control.
Muoghalu et al. (1990) examine the impact of environmental enforcement measures related
to the American RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and the Superfund Acts
on firms' financial value. Their sample consists of 128 initial lawsuits against finns and 74
case settlements (involving a fine) announced in the print media (generally the Wall Street
Journal) between 1977 and 1986. The event-study results indicate that stockholders suffer
on average a statistically significant loss of 1.2 percent in market value at the filing of the
lawsuit, with no significant abnonnal returns at the disposition of the suit. Interestingly,
they compute that the abnormal losses due to announcements of lawsuits translate into an
average loss of 33.3 million $ in equity value. Given the small penalties typically imposed
by courts and regulators, this result confirms our hypothesis that losses of market value, if
any, are likely to be significantly larger than the traditional penalties.
Lanoie and Laplante (1994) perform a similar analysis with 9 announcements of
lawsuits and 13 announcements of suit settlements in Canada during the period 1982-1991.
Interestingly, they find results that contrast with those of Muoghalu et al.; i.e., they observe
abnormal losses between  1.65% and 2% when the firm is found guilty (and  fines are
imposed), but no  losses when lawsuits are initiated. This difference may be due to  the
conciliating approach that Canadian environmental authorities have traditionally adopted in
comparison with their American counterparts (see Marchant, 1990). As pointed out earlier,
14it is also interesting to note that the recovery of economic benefits realised as a result of
non-compliance is not a common practice in Canada while it is explicitly incorporated in
the assessment of penalties in the United States. The fact that Canadian shareholders do not
react to the announcement of lawsuits may indicate little or no worry as to the outcome of
the legal procedure, while American environmental authorities seem to have been more
successful in designing enforcement mechanisms in which a lawsuit can impose a credible
threat on investors.
While  negative information may adversely impact the  market value of  a  firm,
Klassen and  McLaughlin (1996) also  find that  environmental awards, denoting public
recognition  of  strong  environmental performance, had  a  positive  impact  on  market
valuation. Based on a sample of 140 events (announcement of an environmental award)
collected over the period 1985 - 1991 in the United States, these authors find that upon
announcement of the award, market valuation increases on average by 0.82%; this translates
into an average increase of over 80 millions $US. They also find, based on a sample of 22
events collected over the same period of time that the announcement of an environmental
crisis resulted in an average decline in market valuation of  1.5%; this translates into an
average loss of over 390 millions $US for the firms involved. Note that the information
used in these three studies would classify as individual information.
In  contrast with the preceding studies, two papers have analysed the deliberate
provision of information to the markets (by regulators or third parties), and its impact on
15firms' value. This information is based on rankings of polluters and can thus be qualified as
collective information. Shane and Spicer (1983) use studies conducted by the Council of
Economic Priorities (CEP) of fimns' environmental performance in four industries (paper,
power, steel, and oil) to analyse the reaction of investors to the release of the results of those
studies. They examine eight studies released by the CEP between 1970 and 1975. They find
that firms'  market value is adversely affected by the release of this information. Perhaps
more interestingly, they also find that firms identified as serious polluters suffered greater
loss of market value than those with a better ranking. Given these results, these authors
conclude that investors use the information to discriminate between companies on the basis
of their environmental performance records.
HIamilton  (1995) examine how financial markets have reacted to the first  edition of
the  "Toxic  Release Inventory"  (TRI)  in  June  1989. The  TRI  reports  information on
manufacturing facilities, with 10 or more employees, that produce or use above a threshold
amount of chemicals on a list of over 300 toxic chemical substances identified by EPA. For
each chemical, the facility submits a form listing releases to the environment broken down
by emission pathways: air, land, underground injection, etc. Furthermore, the TRI  data
contains information on facility name and parent ownership so that media coverage can link
operating facilities  with  their parent  company. Firms  are ranked from  large  to  small
polluters  on  the  basis  of  their  absolute  levels  of  emissions,  thus  allowing  a  direct
comparison of their environmental performance.
16The event-study conducted by Hamilton is based on a sample of 436 enterprises
reporting TRI  pollution figures. Unsurprisingly, most of  these enterprises (75%  of the
sample) are in the manufacturing sector (chemicals, paper, primary metals, petroleum and
textiles) with  12% in the chemical industry. Results show that these firms experienced
negative, statistically significant abnormal returns between 0.2 and 0.3 % upon the first
release of the information. These abnormal returns translated into an average loss of $4.1
million in  stock value on the day the pollution figures were released, with firms in the
primary metals industry experiencing a smaller loss of market value (presumably because
these firms were already perceived as large polluters by the market). He also finds that the
larger the number of chemicals a firm reported to produce or handle at its facilities, the
larger the loss the firm suffered in its market value: for each additional chemical, Hamilton
measures a  loss  of  $236,000. 8  Perhaps more interestingly, Konar and  Cohen  (1997)
recently found that firms with the largest decline in stock value on the day the information
contained in the TRI was made public, subsequently reduced their emissions more than
other finns in the same industrial sector of activities. These results partly support former
EPA director's claim that "(...) the Toxics Release Inventory is fast becoming one of the
most powerful tools we have to reduce toxic emissions." (New York Times, October 13,
1991). On the basis of this later result, it would therefore appear that financial markets may
provide firms with incentives  to improve their environ-mental  performance.
18  Referring to the TRI, J.S. Naimon of the Investor Responsibility Research Center is quoted as saying:
"(...) companies that emit a lot of toxic waste do not have good fnancial  indications in the long term."
(New York Times, October  13, 1991)
17New resuls
Since July 1990, every six months or so the Ministry of the Environment of British
Columbia (BC, Canada) publishes a list of polluters identified into two categories: (1) firms
that are currently not complying with an environmental standard or permit; and (2) firms
that are of concern to the Ministry because their environmental performance is near the
regulatory threshold, or because their level of pollution is abnormally high in a sector of
activity which is not regulated. Since these lists do not provide a ranking of enterprises, and
do  not  allow  for  a  comparison of  their  environmental performance, we  classify this
information as individual information.
In the following, we examine the impact of the first five lists of polluters on the
equity value of firms appearing on these lists. Our analysis complement that of Hamilton
(1995) in two different ways: (1) it is based on a Canadian list providing a different set of
informations than those released in the TRI; and (2) we investigate how investors treat the
information about firms  appearing successively on more than one list, while Hamilton
focused exclusively on the first release of the TRI.
Table 1 presents a list of 19 firms quoted on the stock market and appearing on any
of these first five lists. This table shows whether a firm has been identified as "out-of
compliance" or  as "of  concern". Furthermore, it indicates that multi-plants firms  may
appear more than once on the same list if many of their plants are either non-complying or
of concern.
18We use the SIMM (single-index market model) version of the standard event-study
technique to analyze investors' reaction to the publication of the lists.  A three days event
window  (DAY -1,  DAY 0  and  DAY +1)  is considered, where  DAY 0  refers  to  the
publication date of the list19. We first look at the whole sample of firms appearing on each
list. Then, we examine more specifically  the firms that are of concern versus those that are
TABLE 1
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IDENTIFIED IN THE LISTS OF POLLUTERS
-:::--  EN RPRISES:  LIST :1  LIST 2  L  3  LIST 4.  T  L  5
12-07-90  1-12  -90 2247-91:  24-01-9  06-1-9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.......'-  ,.9-  _.40-'''''  '  ''-::
Alcan Aluminium Ltd.  c,pp  c,pPp  c,p  c,p  c,p
B.C. Sugar Refnery  Ltd.  p  p  c,p  c,p  c,p
Canadian Pacific Forest Products Lt.d  c,p  c,p  c  c  c
Canadian Pacific Ltd.
Canfor Corp.
Cominco Ltd.  c,pPp  c,pp  cc,pppp  ccc,ppp  c,ppp
Equity Silver Mines Ltd.  p  p
Flectcher Challenge Canada Ltd.  ccc  cc  c  c  c
George Weston Ltd.  c  c  c
Imperial Oil Ltd. (Esso Petroleum Canada)  c  c,p  cc  c
International Corona corp.  c  c  c  c
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.  c,ppp  c,ppp  ccc  cccc  cccc,p
Methanex Corp.  -
Noranda Inc.  p  p  p  p  p
Placer Dome  c  p  c  c
Repap Entreprises Inc.  c  c  c  c
Shell Canada Ltd.  X  - cc,pp  _  c
Westar Group  c,pp
Westmnin  Resources Ltd.  p  p  c  P
I The number of letters indicate the number of times that the enterprise appeared on the list.
p: plants not complying with pollution standards
c:  plants of concern to the Ministry  l
19  Certain companies were discarded in the analysis because of confounding  events such as an
announcement of dividend pay-off, profits,  merger, take-over or new share emissions.
19out-of-compliance, and the firms that have appeared once on a given list versus those that
have appeared  several times.  Finally, to  investigate how  investors react to  successive
appearances on different lists, we perform an analysis in which only firms that appeared on
all lists (whether being of concern or out-of compliance) are considered.
Table  2  reports  the  results  obtained using  the  whole  sample of  firns  at  the
publication of each list. There is no statistically abnormal loss on any day of the event
window for any of the list. Contrary to what was observed by Hamilton (1995) and Shane
and Spicer (1983), this suggests that appearing on the BC polluters' list has no impact on a
firm's equity value.
TABLE 2
WHOLE  SAMPLE RESULTS
DAY -1  DAY 0  DAY +1
LIST  Size of
t. stat  t. stat  t. stat  sample
LI  0,0017  0.003  00026  13
-'  .'.'  . .. :(0  a....-,  '.  }'.  Q  d'-"S.''f  a.  ' , -..  ..  '.......  .. ...  . (0,543)  (091-9)  (0,38
L2  0,0037  0,0029  -0,005  12
,,,,,?,f,,,ff  - - -d  4  ?,00-,f,f-;--  S'  - -f--  -....  ..  .. ,  ,,  .....  .............  . , ,  .. ,......20  (071.46  (563:  -093-73
L3  -0,006  0,0033  -0,009  7
(-0,932)  (0,5623  -,7
L4  -0,007  -0,004  0,0006  7
(  -0,8972  (;  -0,5353)  (,04
L5  0,0018  0,0042  -0,01 
(0,75)(068)(127
A number of reasons may explain this result. First, it may be that BC's  lists of
polluters do not provide new or unexpected information to investors. Canada is a much
smaller market than the United States, with only a very few large public enterprises. The
first release of the TRI provided a set of detailed information on releases of a large number
20of severe pollutants, information more likely to  be unknown to the investors than that
provided by the BC list. Moreover, it is important to note that in any given list, the Ministry
of the Environment does not systematically  report all firms out of compliance or of concern
ot the Ministry. A firm may be out of compliance (or of concern) and yet never appear on
the lists, or appear only after a number of lists have been published: not being listed is not
necessarily an indication of good environmental performance.  As we have noted before, this
feature of the BC's lists of polluters do not allow investors to rank firms according to their
environmental performance. Furthermore, given the  characteristics of the  economy  of
British Columbia,  unsurprisingly the companies listed in  BC's  lists  are mostly in  the
primary sector (resources) of the  economy; therefore, any potential decline in  demand
resulting from an adversarial reputation effect may be less important than in Hamilton's
sample which covered firms in a broader set of activities. Finally, investors may believe that
appearing  on  BC's  lists  does  not  represent  any  significant threat  for  the  companies
involved. Given our earlier discussion, the difference between the American results and
those presented here may again indicate that American environmental authorities have been
more successful in designing policy mechanisms that create a credible threat for firms.
Table 3a and Table 3b provide a more detailed analysis in which different categories
of finrs  are distinguished. In Table 3a, firms that are out-of-compliance and those that are
of concern are analyzed separately. One could expect that firms out of compliance would be
under a more important threat than those of concern. On the other hand, the fact that firms
are of concern for the environmental authorities could be new information to the market;
21this could  have  more impact  on the value  of firms  reported  under  this heading.  As shown  in
Table 3a however, no statistically  significant  abnormal  losses can be detected in either
category.
In Table  3b, we distinguish  between  firms  that appear  once  on a given  list and those
that appear more than once. One would expect that for environmental  authorities,  the
pressure  to take actions  against  a polluter  may be "cumulative"  so that finns appearing  more
than once  on a given  list could  experience  more  important  abnormal  losses.  The results
TABLE  3a
Plants out of compliance  Plants of concern
DAY  -1  DAY 0  DAY +1  DAY -1  DAY 0  DAY +1
LIST  Size  of  Size of
t. stat  t. stat  t. stat  sample  t. stat  t. stat  t. stat  sample
LI  -0,002  0,01486**  0  4  0,0179*  0,0064  0,0097  3
(-0,264) (223)  (0081  l9)  (777)  (i.33  ..... 60-t  ^  -. i  i:--1.040  . ......... i:i.  .............. i0t:0  -- 0-  81--  2  -i  g  . . -
L2  0,0079  -0,004  0,0039  4  0,01014  0,01277  -0,003  4
(1,028) (-0,575)  (0,574  ((:):UO.:)  -323>5)
L3  -0,002  -0,0125  0  4  -0,0136  0,0026  -0,0308
(0-,1iI01)  (-0, 513  )t  0-  34i-  7-Q,-i  761)  ..........
L4  0,01149  -0,007  -0,009  2  0,0015  -0,004  0,0056
L5  -0,002  0,0013  -0,007  4  -0,003  0,0013  -0,0144  3
(0,265)  012)(0,4)  (1-Q.29-65)  (0,1351)  (.-1.,485)i~  ....
22TABLE 3b
Firms  appearing  once  Firms appearing  more  than once
DAY  -1  DAY  0  DAY  +1  DAY  -1  DAYO  DAY  +1
LIST  Size  of  Size of
t. stat  t. stat  t. stat  sample  t. stat  t. stat  t. stat  sample
LI  0,0048  0,011096*  0,00406  7  0,00381  0  -0,0022  6
(9  (1,814)  (0,2)  (0,5021)  51)  (-0,1)
L2  0,0086  0,00263  0,0009  7  -0,0011  *  0  -0,01091  *  5
(1,333)  (0,4052  (1426}  -- :1,677)  (-0-007)  (-1,712:
L3  -0,003  -0,01159  -0,0035  4  -0,0067  0,006  -0,01012  3
(-:.j-426)-  (-1,6174)  (,188)  (-0,8977)  (0,7953)  (-1,347)
L4  0,0059  -0,0053  -0,001  2  -0,01183  -0,004  0,0009  5
(0,5241)  (-  -004  1  (-1,38)  (-04156)  (0,1042) :.  RI
L5  -0,003  0,0017  -0,01026  7  0,015537  0,0091  -0,0039  2
(-,433):  ,2495):  :(-1,504).::  (1,5  01)--  (°,876)  :(-,3  -- :767)
*  Statistically  significant  at the 90% level.
**  Statistically  significant  at the 95% level.
seem to confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, we obtain statistically abnormal losses on day -1
and day +1 for firms appearing more than once on the second list: -0.1 % on day -1 and -1
% on day +1. Such abnormal negative returns for firms appearing several times on the
second  list  may  indicate  that  investors  required  strong  signals  about  a  firm's  bad
environmental performance before revising the expected value attributed to this firm.
Table 4 provides further evidence that investors may have reacted in the way we just
described.  In this Table, we consider a sample of firms that have appeared on every list so
as to investigate how investors handle the informnation  contained in successive appearances
on the list. There were two such firms. Again, the only significant abnormal loss appears for
the second list on day +1 (a loss of 2 %) suggesting that investors needed strong indications
before changing their expectations. No abnormal losses beyond the second list may mean
23that appearing  on the list has a once-for-all  effect,  and that successive  appearance  does not
provide  significant  new information.
TABLE  4
ENTREPRISES  APPEARING  ON THE  FIRST  FIVE LISTS
DAY  -1  DAY  0  DAY  +1
LIST
t. stat  t. stat  t. stat
LI  0,004622  0,002476  0,011362
$gtt  0,4706-  l0,2519-  1,1490--S  -
L2  -0,00592  0,008302  -0,020457**
0 0-0,571  t  lg0,8019  -1l  969
L3  -0,010403  0,009997  -0,014264
-10  i  ;0079  1,034  -1,4-;g--8  0 
L4  -0,01294  -0,0044  -0,00159
- -1,145  l  0  ,38  g  0  .....
L5  0,009816  0,024394*  -0,00933
it;;00,75270  .. ......  1-893'  -724
*  Statistically significant at the 90% level.
-*  Statistically significant at the 95% level.
5.  Concluding remarks
It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of pollution
control, profit-maximizing  firms may choose not to invest their resources in pollution
abatement  since the expected  penalty imposed by regulators  falls considerably  short of
the investment  cost. This however  ignores that markets and communities  can also create
incentives  for pollution control to the extent that they possess information  regarding a
polluter's environmental  performance.  Regulators  have recently  embarked  on a deliberate
strategy to release information  to markets (investors  and consumers)  and communities
regarding  firms' environmental  performance  in order to enhance  incentives  for pollution
control.
24In this paper, we analyze the role that capital markets may play to  create such
incentives. Evidence drawn from American and Canadian studies indicates that capital
markets react to the release  of information, and that  large polluters are affected more
significantly from such release than smaller polluters. Hence, regulatory agencies can use,
in addition to traditional regulatory measures, information-oriented approaches so as to
harness the power of communities and markets to put pressure on polluters. This result
however  appears to  be  a  function of  the regulator's  willingness  to  undertake  strong
enforcement  actions (United States Vs Canada), as  well as the possibility  for capital
markets  to  rank  and  compare  firms  with respect  to  their  environmental performance
(Council of Economic Priorities and TRI Vs British Columbia's lists of polluters).
Further research in this area will indicate the circumstances under which the release
of information can create incentives for pollution control by empowering the agents that can
bear pressure on polluters. In particular, current research will indicate whether or not capital
markets  in  developing countries  can create  incentives for  pollution  control.20 Further
research should also indicate whether or not this information not only has an impact on
market  valuation, but  ultimately whether or  not  it  affects a  polluter's  environmental
performance.
20  Research  is currently  taking  place  in Argentina,  Chile,  Indonesia,  Mexico, and Philippines (RPO
68076)..
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